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RECENT CASES

attempt to present a case against the defendant in trial free of
substantial legal error.
The United States Supreme Court has held that for a state to try
a defendant after he has been acquitted by a federal court is not a
violation of the double jeopardy prohibition. Double jeopardy only
protects a defendant from successive prosecutions by the same
sovereign.8
As indicated, when there is more than one offense involved in the
act which the accused allegedly committed, the accused may be
prosecuted for each offense; i.e., without incurring the double jeopardy
prohibition. The offenses must be capable of standing alone with all
the necessary elements of each offense present. It is the individual
offenses that are being tried and not the "act."
Kentucky's definition of double jeopardy is built on the same concept of separate offenses arising out of the same act that has been
used in many courts from early times. By being able to find two
separate offenses in the act committed by Runyon, the court was able
to apply this separate offense idea. This application permitted the
court to affirm the lower court's decision that the defendant was not
placed in double jeopardy by the second trial on the false claim
indictment.
0. Lawrence Mielke
CmimaNA LAw-SEARcH INCIDENT To ARET FOR TIRFc VioLronoNPLAwN Vmw DoCMWE-CONs=r.-The defendant was convicted of il-

legally transporting alcoholic beverages in local option territory. After
arresting the defendant for reckless driving, the officer discovered the
evidence necessary for the above conviction by looking through an
opening between the fender and trunk lid of defendant's automobile.
The arresting officer had to assume a crouched or bent-over position
before the evidence was visible. After this disclosure the defendant
consented to open the trunk. Held: Reversed. The mere fact of an
arrest for a traffic or other minor violation does not give the arresting
officer an absolute right to search the vehicle or premises indiscriminately. There was no reasonable basis for the officer's searching
the trunk of the car in connection with the charge of reckless driving.
The evidence was not "clearly" or "plainly" visible and the search was
not accomplished with the voluntary consent of the appellant. Johns
v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 890 (Ky. 1965).
In the past, several cases have upheld searches and seizures
8

Bartkus v. llinois, 859 U.S. 121 (1959).
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following an arrest for a traffic violation. These cases reasoned that
a search incident to an arrest is lawful; the defendant has violated a
traffic law; and therefore the defendant is subject to search. Most
often cited among these decisions is a Michigan case1 where the
defendant was convicted of possessing liquor. He was arrested for
speeding, at which time his automobile was searched and the liquor
found. The court upheld the conviction by saying that since the
arrest was lawful, it was also lawful for the officers to search the
person of the defendant and the vehicle in which he was then riding.
More recently, however, there have been a number of decisions
by the supreme courts of several states which have concluded that a
search is valid only when the search is made for the "fruits" of the
crime for which the defendant is arrested, or is reasonably necessary
to protect the officer from attack, or to prevent the offender from
escaping a serious charge.
Other limitations have been placed on the power to search incident
to traffic violations. In People v. Mayo,2 the Illinois Supreme Court
held that the search of a glove compartment following an arrest for
parking too far from the curb was an unreasonable search and policy
slips found therein were inadmissable. Similarly, in People v. Molarius,3 the court had occasion to examine the legality of a search of
an automobile in which suspects were riding when arrested for making
an unlawful turn. The court held the search could not be justified as
incident to the arrest where it bears no relation to the traffic violation.
In an Oklahoma case,4 the defendant was convicted of unlawful
transportation of intoxicating liquor following a search of the automobile when the defendant passed a car in a no passing zone. While
this decision permitted a search of the person and the immediate
surroundings for a weapon for the safety of the officer, it condemned
the search of the trunk. In a very similar case, 5 the Tennessee Supreme
Court also held that a search of the trunk was unjustified.
A recent Kentucky case" places us in line with this modem trend
by holding that an arrest for a traffic violation does not give the
arresting officer an absolute right to search the vehicle. In that case
the defendant was arrested for improper passing, and a search of the
trunk of the automobile he was driving uncovered the alcoholic
beverages which were used to convict him.
IPeople v. Davis, 247 Mich. 536, 226 N.W. 337 (1929).

219 Ill.
2d 136, 166 N.E.2d 440 (1960).

3 146 Cal. App. 2d 129, 303 P.2d 350 (1956).
Grim. 299, 262 P.2d 464 (1953).
5Elliott v. State, 173 Tenn. 203, 116 S.W.2d 1009 (1938).
6Lane v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1964).

4 Brinegar v. State, 97 Okla.
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It appears that the ground work for this Kentucky decisional law
was laid as early as 1920 in a leading case on the subject of search
and seizure, Youman v. Commonwealth.7 This case limited a search
incident to an arrest to those things connected with the offense for
which he was arrested or any weapon which might enable the
prisoner to escape or do some act of violence.
The rationale of the above cited cases would seem to easily
encompass Johns unless, as brought out by the court, it may be said
that the alcoholic beverages were in plain view, or the search was
made pursuant to the voluntary consent of the defendant.
Many courts have held that if the object is something in plain view,
then there is actually no search. 8 The Kentucky Court of Appeals
9
explained what is meant by "plain view" in Clark v. Commonwealth,
which held that the constitutional guaranty against illegal search
does not prohibit seizure without a warrant where there is no
need of search; that is, where the outlawed object discovered is
visible, open and obvious to anyone who even casually looks about
his surroundings. An earlier case', upheld the seizure of copper wire
which was in plain view in the back seat of an automobile. The court,
using these standards, said that the contraband in Johns was not
plainly visible as the officer would not have observed the beer but for
his painstaking inspection of the car.
The court's decision that there was no voluntary consent present in
Johns is an expression of the better view and follows an abundance of
Kentucky precedent."
This decision was the logical result of the fact that defendant was
under physical arrest, and had no recourse except to submit to the
given conauthority of the officer. As the court said, "his reluctantly
2
sent was nothing more than yielding to the inevitable."'
The Johns case reaches a correct and sound result. The Kentucky
court has shown great concern for the protection of its citizens'
constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.
James W. Barnett
7 189 Ky. 152, 224 S.W. 860 (1920).

FKoscieslsky v. State, 199 Ind. 546, 158 N.E. 902 (1927); State v. Christensen, 151 Ore. 529, 51 P.2d 835 (1935).

9 388 S.W.2d 622 (Ky. 1965).

10 Childers v. Commonwealth, 286 S.W.2d 369 (Ky. 1955).

11 Smith v. Commonwealth, 283 Ky. 492, 421 S.W.2d 881 (1940); Thomas

v. Commonwealth, 226 Ky. 101, 10 S.W.2d 606 (1928); Witt v. Commonwealth,
219 Ky. 519, 293 S.W. 1072 (1927); Duncan v. Commonwealth, 198 Ky. 841,
250 S.W. 101 (1923); Mattingly v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky. 30, 250 S.W. 105
(1923). See also, Coleman v. Commonwealth, 219 Ky. 139, 292 S.W. 771

(1927).
P2 394 S.W.2d at 892-93.

